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1. Introduction
When scientists are asked to assist a court in the evaluation of the results of forensic examinations, a
fundamental question arises: what are the generic principles underlying sound inference to which
scientists ought to adhere? This question is the object of on-going discussions and diverging opinions
in the forensic science community. In this commentary, we discuss this topic from three perspectives.
The first pertains to the need for scientists to agree on the generic precepts which evaluative reasoning
ought to conform to, and the requirement that these should be stated clearly. Secondly, we shall argue
that—as conveyed by the label ‘generic’—these inferential requirements are independent of the fo-
rensic area of practice. Thirdly, we maintain that these precepts ought—if encoded—to take the form
of a standard, not a mere guideline.
The general argument pursued in this commentary is that adherence to sound principles of reasoning
is not a matter of choice but a matter of scientific integrity. However, since it is insufficient to rely on
the good will of professionals to warrant such integrity, logical principles should be enforced through a
standard (contrary to an opinion recently expressed in this Journal, Simmross, 2014).
We limit our considerations mainly to forensic science practice, rather than to the broader topics of
the nature of judicial inference and the functioning of judicial processes and systems as a whole. We
believe that the forms framing scientific reasoning (and leading to a forensic scientist’s conclusions)
necessarily precede the reporting stage, so that these forms can be considered independently of
whether or not other parts of the judicial system also endorse these generic principles of reasoning.
We believe that the forensic scientist should first comply with these agreed principles and then report
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his or her findings in a way that conforms to the law. In that transition—from findings to reporting—
the scientist should not compromise the principles that we will expose below.
2. The need to agree on generic principles
The evaluation of forensic science results must be based on agreed principles for two main reasons.
First, a particular practice can only be deemed scientific if it is based on foundational understandings,
which is theory that is formally stated and open to inspection. With no understanding and theory of the
kinds that characterize science, forensic practice would be reduced to mere technology, which does not
necessarily demand such fundamental insight (Wolpert, 1993). Secondly, the requirement for a con-
sensus on evaluative principles derives from the intended context of application. Indeed, contemporary
criminal justice systems strive to base their verdicts on what is referred to as a rational evaluation of
evidence, be it scientific or otherwise (Bender et al., 2007, p. 139 ff.; Kauffmann, 2009, p. 185 ff.;
Jackson and Summers, 2012, p. 14 ff.; Twining, 2006, p. 35 ff.). Stated otherwise, the application of the
reasoning scheme should not lead to logically contradictory conclusions. In a process that ultimately
affects the lives of defendants and victims in a most fundamental way, it is a minimum prerequisite that
scientists be able to state the generic principles underlying the evaluation of their analytical findings. In
particular, where verdicts (especially guilty verdicts) against defendants involve results of forensic
examinations, the assessment of their strength must be based on principles that qualify as logically
valid in the sense mentioned above.
As an auxiliary to the judicial system, forensic science should thus rely on a well-articulated
framework. Yet, forensic scientists exhibit a remarkable diversity of practice when reporting the
results of their examinations. Many claims are not based on formal logical grounds, and scientists
making such claims rely on the trust that courts place in them because of their education and/or long-
standing experience. The situation is even more peculiar with some forensic practitioners who, at least
in some informal discussion, refuse to articulate any inferential principles explicitly as they do not
consider their field to be a conventional area of (scientific) practice. Instead, they refer to it as a form of
art. This lack of transparency prevents others, namely the court and the parties, from assessing the
logical foundations of the inferential process used in the case at hand and, if necessary, reproducing it.
The mere statement of a particular forensic practice or art (e.g. the comparative examination of
toolmarks), however, subtle and reliably performed is merely descriptive. It lacks a statement of
sound inferential principles and appears to misconceive the normative nature of the inferential frame-
work (Biedermann et al., 2014).
3. The need to be coherent across all areas of forensic science
Discrepancies that cannot be rationalized exist in the way conclusions are constructed and reported by
scientists in various areas of forensic science. For example, representatives of the marks and impres-
sions community (e.g. fingermarks, toolmarks, footwear marks, handwriting) widely adhere to a
practice based on categorical conclusion scales (involving, e.g. terms such as ‘individualization’ or
‘exclusion’), whereas DNA analysts tend to formulate their conclusions in terms of degree or extent of
support with respect to selected propositions of interest. This fundamental difference is not mentioned
here to determine ‘who is right’, but to ask whether it is sensible to have different inferential frame-
works in various areas of practice. Our own view is that there is essentially one way to reason under
uncertainty, independent of the nature of the discipline considered. We contend that this one way,
based on probability theory, should apply across all forensic disciplines, essentially because it ensures
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coherence in the reasoning processes. The probabilistic framework provides a reference point against
which actual modes of reasoning, intuitive or otherwise unaided can be compared so as to determine
whether they are internally consistent (Robertson and Vignaux, 1993). As such, the probabilistic
framework provides what is typically referred to as a standard (Lindley, 2014).
The law itself does not discriminate between the various fields within forensic science when it
comes to assessing the admissibility of a given technique or the probative weight of a set of analytical
results. For instance, the so-called Daubert trilogy regulating the admissibility of expert evidence in
the U.S. federal courts1 applies transversally to any type of expert knowledge.2 Similarly, legal sys-
tems in Continental Europe tend to subject the evaluation of all types of scientific evidence to the same
set of principles and rules (Champod and Vuille, 2011).
More generally, it would be short-sighted to limit our perspective to forensic science. The issue is
more fundamental. In fact, disciplines such as philosophy of science and mathematics have worked on
inferential procedures for centuries (Howson and Urbach, 2005). Suggesting that fundamental prin-
ciples of scientific reasoning do not apply to the field of forensic science would be tantamount to
claiming that our field has resolved, bypassed or got away with problems that have not yet been
resolved in other scientific disciplines. That such is the case is doubtful (Biedermann and Curran,
2014).
4. The need to adopt standards, not mere guidelines
If we were to state formally the principles according to which evaluative reasoning should be con-
ducted in the forensic science field, what status ought this statement have? Should it take the form of a
guideline or should it be a standard? Some discussants (e.g. Simmross, 2014) argue that a guideline
would leave the necessary freedom for forensic scientists to exercise their expert activity within the
legal framework of their country. We do not espouse that view because it conveys the idea that the
legal context is put forward as a ‘deflecting shield’ to avoid facing the need for a defined evaluative
framework.
By definition, a guideline is not binding, nor is it enforced. It is a non-mandatory statement to direct
particular courses in practical proceedings. A standard, in turn, is mandated by policy. The very large
majority of forensic science practitioners views standards suspiciously, and would prefer having
evaluative principles be encoded in the form of a guideline.3 The underlying motive for this seems
to be that if the prescribed framework of reasoning (e.g. probability) is not endorsed, the resulting non-
conformity is not subject to sanctioning. This would obviously place forensic scientists in a comfort-
able position: they could adhere to the stated guide of reasoning if they wish to do so, and would not
need to fear any complications in case of non-conformity. But this effortless attitude does not come
without some price and, as we argue below, the cost will be born by criminal defendants.
The idea of a guideline would imply that, in principle, scientists could deviate from the reference
approach when evaluating the results of their examinations. But what other approaches are there?
Some procedures deviate explicitly from a probabilistic reference, or have features whose logical
credentials are unknown, not established or questionable. This is most typically illustrated by the
1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997);
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
2 On the Daubert standard, see Faigman et al. (2013) and Rosenblum (2000).
3 This is paradoxical in view of the fact that forensic science actually abounds in standards for all kinds of aspects, mainly
technical, relating to operational laboratory practice.
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known logical flaws adopted by tradition and without full awareness by practitioners involved in the
forensic fields aiming at ‘individualisation’ (e.g. Saks and Koehler, 2005; Champod, 2013; Cole,
2014). This raises a fundamental issue for defendants and other participants in the legal process:
should they take comfort in the idea that it is left to the discretion of the scientist to decide what
evaluative approach—logical or otherwise—they will retain in the defendant’s case? As scientists we
must concede that we cannot credibly claim to be able to answer such a question regarding legal
implications. Instead, we must realize that our practical choices have fundamental consequences for
subsequent parts of the legal process. Thus, if there is essentially one logical framework for reasoning
under uncertainty, then, as scientists, we can see no reason not to pursue our effort to adhere to this
reference approach. Regarding it as a standard should not be seen as a constraint, but merely as a
natural translation of good scientific practice.
5. Conclusion
If it can be agreed that there is a scientifically rigorous way of reasoning, which represents a safeguard
against fallacious conclusions, we see no persuasive reason in principle why it should not be a re-
quirement to follow it and why it could not be retained as a standard. An analogy may help to illustrate
this proposal: as there are rules governing the logical reasoning under uncertainty, arithmetic deals with
fundamental operations for the combination of numbers, such as addition and subtraction that are
universally accepted and used in basic day-to-day counting. Would you be happy if you knew that your
bank manages the balance of your account according to rules that might, but not necessarily will (for
reasons that are left to the sole discretion of your bank), conform to the way prescribed by basic
arithmetic? Certainly not. The same precept holds for court proceedings and forensic science. Matters
dealt with in court are important and consequential enough to require that information for and against a
defendant be assessed according to the most stringent principles of reasoning. Either one applies these
principles, or the evidence should not be assessed and retained at all, on pain of incoherence.
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